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SYLLABUS.
Donalis Aforlis Causa-Delivery-Evidence.
In a suit to establish a gift morlis causa it was held (r) that the fact
that the donor disposed of his entire personal estate, provided there was
specific delivery of the subject matter, could not be urged as an objection
to a decree establishing the gift; (2) the delivery of the keys of a box,
containing stocks, bonds, securities, etc., representing a value of $2oo,ooo,
was sufficient to uphold a gift "of the contents of the box;" (3) but that
the delivery of a pass-book on a bank, showing a balance in the donor's
favor of $i8,ooo, was insufficient to sustain a gift of that fund.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the
Court.
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Peatross & Harris, Win. j. Robertson, and G. W Hansbrough, for appellant. Edmund Waddill,Jr., Chiristian &
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for appellees.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
FAUNTLEROY,

J.1 The petition of Legh R. Page, ad-

ministrator of William A. Thomas, deceased, represents
that on the 4 th of January, 1889, the said William A.
Thomas died intestate, leaving an estate valued at some
$225,000, of which some $20o,00 was realty, $18,ooo on
deposit in the Planters' National Bank of Richmond, and
the balance, represented by bonds, stocks, choses in action,
and gold coin, deposited in a rented box in the vaults of
the said bank. That on the I 4 th day of January, 1889, the
county court of Henrico County, on the motion of the
heirs at law of the said decedent, appointed William R.
Quarles and Mann S. Quarles curators of the said estate,
who immediately qualified as such by giving bond in the
penalty of $300,ooo, and entered upon the discharge of
their duties. That on the 29 th day of January, 1889, said
I A portion

of the opinion has been omitted.
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Bettie Lewis, along with her husband, filed her bill in the
chancery court of the city of Richmond, against the aforesaid curators, in which she asserted that said William A.
T-homas, deceased, during his last illness, by gift causa
norlis, gave her the keys to the tin box in the vault of the
Planters' National Bank above described, and with them
all the property contained therein. That he gave her the
pass-book showing the status of his account with said
Planters' "Bank for money placed on deposit therein, and
with it gave to her the balance on deposit to his credit in
said bank, amounting as aforesaid to some $x8,ooo; and
that he also gave to her several negotiable notes, aggregating less than $i,ooo, which he had with him at his residence at the time of his last illness. That to this bill the
curators filed their joint demurrer and answer, denying the
claim asserted by said Bettie Lewis; denying that said
Thomas had attempted during his last illness to make a
gift to the plaintiff of said property; and insisting that
actual possesion of the several subjects of this pretended
donation had never come to or remained with the plaintiff;
and that no possession, either actual or constructive, by
her, at the joint residence of the donor and donee, could
-ender valid the alleged gift, the same not being evidenced
by deed or will. That on the 1 9 th day of February, 1889,
petitioner, Legh R. Page, was appointed administrator of
the estate of said William A. Thomas, deceased, by the
county court of Henrico County, and, as such, he filed his
answer to the bill of said Bettie Lewis. Before the assets
in the hands of the curators aforesaid could be turned over
to petitioner, the chancery court of the city of Richmond,
on the motion of Bettie Lewis, appointed N. W. Bowe and
I. A. Coke receivers, to take charge of and hold of all the
aforesaid assets, pending a decision of the questions raised
by the suit aforesaid. After the appointment of the aforesaid receivers, depositions were taken by both Plaintiff and
defendants, and the case made ready for a hearing at the
June term, 1890, of the chancery court. The cause was
argued, elaborately and exhaustively, before the Honorable
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E. H. FITZHUGH, the judge of the said court. No decree
was, however, rendered by him, he having unexpectedly
and suddenly died before the next term of his court. The
Honorable W. J. LEAKE having been appointed his successor, the cause was again argued, at great length, before
him; and on the 8th day of January, 1891, a decree was
pronounced by him, sustaining the claim of the said Bettie
Lewis (as preferred in her bill) to all the personal estate of
the said William A. Thomas, deceased, except the sum of
$18,ooo, money on deposit in the Planters' National Bank,
which was awarded to petitioner, as administrator aforesaid. From this decree the case is here on appeal.
The question raised in the controversy, and to be
decided by this Court, is, what constitutes a valid gift
causa moiw-is? and whether the evidence adduced by the
complainant comes up to the law's requirements to establish
such a gift by the decedent, William A. Thomas, to the
complainant, Bettie Thomas Lewis, by and through the
facts and circumstances detailed in the bill and attested by
the proofs. It is essential to a correct and just estimate of
the facts of the case, as disclosed by the record, that they
be viewed in the light of the history and relations of the
parties to the controversy, the congruities of the case, and
the legal weight of the testimony.
The witness, Fannie Coles, says: "Mr. Thomas called
Bettie to his bedside, and said, 'Bettie, I am a very sick
man, I do not know what may happen;' and lie said,
'Bettie, look into my pants' pocket and bring me my keys,
my penknives, my two purses, and look in the inside of my
vest pocket and bring me a package of papers tied with a
red string.' She brought them to his bed to him, and he
said, 'Bettie, I am going to give you these things as
yours.' " He gave her the keys to his top bureau drawer,
and told her that in that drawer she would find two notes
in a white envelope; to get these notes out of the drawerthat they were hers. Then he opened a small black purse
and took out a small package of white tissue paper. Out
of this paper he took some keys, and he said, 'Bettie, here
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are the keys to my safe at Drewry & Co.'s, and to the box
I have in the vault of the bank.' He says, 'At Drewry &
Co.'s, in the safe, you will not find anything of any great
value, but whatever you find in that safe you can have.
Now, Bettie, these keys that I now give you that belong to
the box in the vault at the bank is where all my valuables
are. Whatever you find in that box you can have as yours;
and, Bettie, whatever you do, don't let anyone get these
keys away from you on any pretence. Swing on to them
as you would your life.' Then he took up his pocket-book,
and gave it to her, and told her it had no great amount in
the pocket-book, but that it was her's. Then he took up
the package of papers that was tied with a red string, and
he said, 'Bettie, in this package you will find my bankbook, showing you how much I have in bank. Whatever
it calls for you can have as yours, and in this package,
also, you will find some notes. They will be money for
you; you can have them also. Bettie, I wish you to take
these papers, my purses, and my knives-I give you these
also--and put them in your trunk. I don't want you to
put them in my bureau, but put them between your
clothes for safe-keeping; for, Bettie, you will have to take
care of these things now. I have been taking care of them
all these years for you.' "
As to what occurred on the afternoon of Friday, the
next day, after Mr. Gilliam left, the witness further testified: "I went up stairs after seeing the gentleman (Mr.
Gilliam) out, that Dr. McGuire sent up, and knocked at
Mr. Thomas' door. Mr. Thomas spoke, and said: 'Come
in, Fannie,' and said, 'Take a seat.'
I said, 'No, sir; I
thank you. I don't care about sitting down.' He said,
' Fannie, take that chair there by the table.' I said, 'No,
sir; I don't care about sitting down.' He said, ' Take that
seat;' and I sat down. In a minute or so a servant knocked
at the door, and said, 'Miss Bettie, I have everything all
ready for you now.'
Bettie said to him, 'Father, won't
you have some lunch now? It is time you were eating
something, as the doctor said you must eat all you can.'
43
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She turned to me, and said, 'Fannie, go down stairs, and
bring something nice up here for father's lunch.' He
turned to me and said, 'Fanny, keep your seat until I tell
you to go,' and he said to Bettie, 'I have something more
important to do than to eat, now.' Then he said to Bettie,
'Where are those things I gave you last night ?' and he
said, ' I hope you have got them where I told you to put
them, safe under lock and key.' Bettie told him, 'Yes,
sir; she had; they were safe.' And he asked, "Where
were they?' and she told him they were safe. And he
told her to go and get them, and bring them to him. She
turned to get them, and instead of putting them in her
trunk, where he had told her the night before, she had
dropped them in his bureau drawer. And he got very
angry with her for putting them in-his bureau drawer, and
said to her, ' Look here, now, Bettie, you had better do as I
tell you about these things I have given you, for your very
life hangs on them, and the bread you eat.' Bettie brought
the things, and laid them on the table in ftont of him, and
he turned to her, and he said, 'Bettie, where is that white
envelope with those two notes in it; get it out of the
drawer, and hand that here also.' Then he asked her and
said, ' Bettie, where is your trunk at? ' She said, ' In my
room, behind the door.' He said, 'Now, Bettie, I want
you to do for once in your life just as I tell you about these
things.' . Then he took the package of papers with the red
string round, untied it, and he said, 'Bettie, I want to
show these to you, and show you the importance of taking
care of them.' He untied the envelope, and took out his
bank-book, and he says, 'Bettie, here is my bank-book,
-which shows you exactly how much I have in bank. I
give you this book, and whatever it calls for you will find
in the bank, and you can have the money.' Then he- laid
the bank-book on the table, and took the-notes out of the
large envelope, and he says, 'Bettie, here's some notes
which will be money for you also.' Then he picked up
that white envelope, and said, 'There are' two notes in
l.ere which will be money for you also. I give these also.'
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Then he laid his hands on them, and said, 'Bettie, these
are yours, and you will have to take care of them.' Then
he picked up a red pocket-book, and he said, 'Bettie,
here's my pocket-book. You will find a little change in it.
Here, take it, keep it, and take good care of it,' and laid
it with the rest of his papers. Then he picked up his little
black purse, and he says, ' Bettie, what I am going to give
you now is of great importance and very valuable. And
he undid this little black purse, and took out the keys, and
said, 'Bettie, these keys belong to the safe at Drewry &
Co.'s, and these which I hold in my hand,' he says, 'belong
to the box which I have in the vault in the bank where all
my valuables are.' He says, 'These keys open the safe at
Drewry & Co.'s. You won't find anything of any great
value in this safe, but what you find in there you can have,
it is yours.' He then handed her the keys of the safe, and
says, 'Now, Bettie, these keys I now give you are where
all my bonds, deeds and valuable papers are.' He said,
' Bettie, these keys I want you to swing on to as you would
your life. Don't let anybody get them away from you on
any pretence. In that box, Bettie, in the vault, you will
find everything valuable I possess in this world. Whatever
you find, Bettie, you can have, it is yours.' Then he
handed her those keys, and handed her the purse, and told
her to be very careful to wrap those keys up in tissue paper
as she found them. Then he gave her his penknives, and
said that he set great store by them, and told her not to
give them away to anybody, and to be careful not to let
anybody steal them from her. Then he turned and tied
these papers all together. He took the two purses, and
slipped them together between the red string, and handed
them to Bettie; and I was sitting by the table, as I first
told you, and he said to her, 'Bettie, I have given you
everything I possessed in the world.' Then he said to me,
'Fannie, you see me give Bettie these things?" I said,
'Yes, sir.' Then he said to her, 'Bettie, you will have
these things to take care of.' He said, 'Bettie, I am a
sick man, and I don't know what may happen to me, and
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I have been taking care of these things all my life; and,
Bettie, you know how careful I am about my papers and
keys; now you will have to do the same.' He said, ' Now,
Bettie, I want you to take this package in your room, and
put it in your own trunk; raise your underclothes up, and
place them between your clothes. Lock the trunk, and
bring me the key here. Bettie, I want to see if your
trunk key is a good one.' He took the two keys to the
trunk, and looked at them, and said, 'Yes, Bettie, they
will do;' and he asked her had she strapped the trunk.
She told him, 'No, she locked it;' and he said to her,
' Bettie, are you crazy ?' She said, 'No,' that she thought
locking the trunk was sufficient; and he told her it was
not sufficient, and to go back and strap it up; that he
had given her all that he had in the world, and that if
she didn't take care of it she would wind up in the poorhouse. Then he turned to me, and asked me again, and
said, 'Now, Fannie, you have seen me give Bettie everything I possess in the world.' Then he turned to me and
told me I could go, that he was through with me. And
Bettie said to me, 'Fannie, go down stairs to the storeroom and get a bottle of that liquid bread, and take the
cork out and bring me a glassful up here for father. I
got the liquid bread, carried it up stairs, and handed it
to Bettie. She handed it to her father. He took a sip
of it, and turned to me, and said again to me, 'Fannie,
you see me give Bettie everything I possess in this world,
didn't you?" I said, 'Yes, sir; I did.' And he turned to
me and said, ' Fannie, remember that now.' And I said,
'Yes, sir.' And he told her to take special care of the
trunk keys; and, whatever she did, not to leave the trunk
open, and let any one steal those things out of there that
he had given her; and if she did, she would go the poorhouse; and to keep her trunk keys on her person day and
night."
It is argued that Mr. Thomas did not make the gift
noior/is causa of his property to his child Bettie, as distinctly
and incontrovertibly proved, because of his oft and emphatic
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statement of intention to provide for her by will; and time
and time again, it is argued that, in the eight or ten minutes of Mr. Gilliam's presence, with him alone, in the
death chamber, only a brief time on Friday afternoon before
he expired, he made an appointment with Mr. Gilliam to
go to Mr. Gilliam's office the next day to have his will
written. Aside from the utter improbability, not to say
impossibility, of an enfeebled and dying old man, in the
country, beyond the limits of the city of Richmond, making
an engagement at 4 o'clock P. i. to arise from what proved
to be his deathbed early that night, and to come into the
city and to a lawyer's office the next day, there is no evidence in the record of any such purpose or possibility.
What passed between Mir. Thomas and Mr. Gilliam, in
those eight or ten minutes, we can never judicially know.
Thomas is dead; and MAIr. Gilliam, one of the counsel for
appellant, has declined to testify in this case.
The appellant, by his cross-examination, elicited from Dr. MIcGuire:
"I think Mr. Gilliam told me, a short time afterwards,
that MNr. Thomas, in his interview with him, said there
were some papers that he wanted to get hold of, then out
of reach, and that he had postponed the making of his will
until the next day. I think lie had an appointment with
M\Ir. Gilliam for the next day. I think Mr. Gilliam said
this." Both this question and answer were objected to by
the plaintiffs as illegal. Mr. Gilliam's attitude, of the
Sphinx, cannot be operated, as hearsay evidence in this
case, by any CEdipus, however respectable; and, howsoever
important or interesting MIr. Gilliam's pregnancy of what
occurred in that brief interview with the dying man may
be, he cannot be delivered by the process of obstetrics,
unknown to the science of the law. If, too, the field of
conjecture be open, it is the most reasonable supposition
that if Mr. Thomas did, in fact, want his will written the
next day, it was only for the purpose of devising to his
daughter, in addition to the personal property lie had given
her, his valuable real estate, which he knew could not be
given except by deed or will. While no witness testifies
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that Thomas ever said that he intended to give his whole
estate to his daughter, yet he frequently declared his purpose to provide for her liberally, and no one ever heard him
say that he intended to give anything to any one else; and
the plain and positive proof is that he did not intend (but
emphatically asserted to the contrary), that his collateral
kindred should have any part of "what he had at his
death." To whom, then, but his daughter, must he have
intended his property to go at his death? If he had left
her his whole estate by a will, instead of the larger part,
only, by donatio morlis causa, all just-minded persons would
have said, as Dr. McGuire's last utterance to him, "You
have only done justice."
Mr. Thomas was buried on Sunday. On the night of
Monday, the next day, Watkins called to see Bettie, and
he says that she did not then say to him that her father
had given her his money, his bank-book, or other securities,
or the key to his box in the bank or his safe at Drewry &
Co.'s, and that she did then say, "as there was no will,
she supposed that all she would have was the property
held by me as trustee, and that she wished I would see
Mr. Gilliam in her behalf." This statement, if true, has
already been explained by what Dr. McGuire and others
had so impressively told Bettie Lewis would be her condition if her father died without a will; but is it not manifestly impossible for Bettie Lewis to have affirmed positively, as a fact to her knowledge, on Monday night, that
Mr. Thomas had left "no will, and she knew it," when
then there had been no opening or examination of Mr.
Thomas' papers or places of safe deposit? Dr. McGuire
says: "Bettie Lewis certainly did not know that before the
old man's death; for she and Fannie both told me that they
didn't know whether the old man had made a will or not,
when Mr. Gilliam was there." Bettie Lewis has been peremptorily denied the privilege of testifying in this case,
notwithstanding the great concern she has at stake; and
simple justice demands that the statements of this witness,
Watkins, for the appellant, should be tested by all the
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touchstones of truth-probability and consistency-which
are the fixed standards of evidence. Out of the mouth of
this witness himself the records show that he involves himself in flat and flagrant self-contradictions; but, first, his
attitude and animus in the case are manifested by his interview with Bettie Lewis on Thursday night, next following. He says: "I told Bettie Lewis that I had been to
see Mr. Gilliam for her, and stated the case to him the
best I could; and he said it was impossible to make a case
of it, and that he was sorry he could not do something
for her. She said it made no difference that she had
employed other counsel, viz., Judge Waddill, Judge Christian and Mr. Edgar Allen. She then said she was very
much obliged to me for seeing Mr. Gilliam for her. I said
to her I had nothing but her interest at stake, and that I
would be glad to know exactly what Mr. Thomas said to
her in his last moments. Fannie Coles, who was sitting
near by, said : 'Bettie, Judge Christian told you not to
talk to any one on the subject.' I said, ' If such are your
instructions, I certainly don't want to hear anything about
it.' " By this, Mr. Watkins' own version, it appears that
after Bettie Lewis had told him she had confided her case
to the counsel of her choice, he, adroitly and artfully prefacing his question with the professing of his disinterested
solicitude for her interest at stake, asked her to tell him
"exactly what Mr. Thomas said to her in his last moments."
The object of this attempt is obvious enough;
but by the significance of Mr. Watkins' attitude in this
case, as disclosed by the record, it is made perspicuously
plain. Fannie Coles' account of this interview, in response
to the 28 7 th cross-question, shows that Mr. Watkins used
importunity and expostulation in his endeavor to induce
Bettie Lewis to let him " know exactly what Mr. Thomas
said to her in his last moments," and that it was not until
he had been repeatedly denied and thwarted in his attempt
that he said (if, indeed, he said it at all), "If such are your
instructions, I certainly don't want to hear anything about
it." Fannie Coles says: "Mr. Watkins came out there
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one night and asked Bettie about her father giving her the
keys. Her reply was to him: ' Mr. Watkins, I do not care
to talk on that subject at all.' Mr. Watkins turned to me
and said: ' Fannie, don't you think Bettie ought to tell me
all about the keys, for I am just the same to her as her
father?' I said: 'Mr. Watkins, I don't know anything
about that. She has her lawyers, and she ought to do as
they told her to do.' And Mr. Watkins said: 'Now, Fannie, you know there is nothing in the world that I would
not do for Bettie.' I said: ' You and Bettie can suit yourselves about the matter. I have no more to say.' Mr.
Watkins again asked her. She said: 'Mr. Watkins, I do
not care to talk on that subject to-night.' And I remember now, as you mention the subject, that Mr. Watkins
said to her: 'Bettie, I only came out here to-night to find
out all about those keys.' " The record shows that this
witness, who professed that he had nothing but Bettie

Lewis' interest in view, and who had promised Mr. Thomas
(as he says) on the I6th day of February, x878, "I will do
the very best for her as long as I live," and who undertook
to see Mr. Gilliam for the purpose of stating " her case"
to him, and of seeing whether he "could make a case of
it," was, a day or two after, if not at the very time, he was
inviting Bettie Lewis' confidence on the ground of his
fatherly interest in and for her, actually conferring with
Mr. Thomas' next of kin, and entertaining a proposition
to be appointed one of the curators, which only failed
because Mr. Pace (Page) objected to going his security, and
that, although he averred his intimate knowledge of Mr.
Thomas' affairs, yet he refused to tell what he knew when
requested so to do by Bettie Lewis' counsel. And this
witness (except a Mr. Gravely, who knows nothing), is the
only witness who has been found to defeat the fully-attested
claim of Bettie Lewis to her father's bounty. He fixes
Monday night, next after Mr. Thomas' death, as the date
he was out at Mr. Thomas' house, by the fact that he went
there to see an insurance policy; and he was certain he
saw the policy there that night, and he swears that he is
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certain that he saw Clay Thomas there that same evening.
Yet he swears that it was on Thursday night that he went
to see and did see and examine the policy, and that it was
on Thursday night that he first saw Clay Thomas there.
This is the unenviable attitude of this the only witness to support the contest of Mr. Thomas' collateral
kindred, and to defeat his dying disposition of the
bulk of his personal property. The testimony and the
circumstances relied on by. the appellant to show that
no such gift was made by Mr. Thomas as sworn to by
Fannie Coles, and attested by corroborating facts, do
not, we think, furnish a sufficient basis for even reasonable
conjecture; much less to assure the guarded discretion of a
court of justice. The circumstance that there is but one
direct witness to the gift, competent to testify (the appellant
declining to allow the donee as a witness when offered),
does not affect the validity of the gift. One witness, if
credible, is sufficient. The law does not require more than
one; and especially, as in this case, when that one is not
only unimpeached, but corroborated. Nor does the magnitude of the gift affect its validity. It may extend to the
whole of the donor's personal estate. The law fixes no
limit. In the case of Duffield v. Elwesl the gift causa
morlis was of the value of $165,ooo. In Hatch v. Atkinson' the Court says: "The common law does not require
the gift to be executed in the presence of any stated number of witnesses; nor does it limit the amount of the propertv that may thus be disposed of."'
The facum of the gift in this case being clearly and
conclusively proved, as we think it indisputably has been,
it only remains to state the law and apply it to the facts
proved. They show all the essential attributes or constituent elements of a dona/jo
m
riis causa, as defined by
the law and established by the course of adjudication. The
IIBligh., N. S., 49756 Me., 327.

3Ward z. Turner. i White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq., pt.
2 Schouler, Pers. Prop., 132-136.
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gift was made in ipericulo mortis, under the apprehension of
death as imminent; and it was of personal property, such
as, under the law, may be the subject of a gift morlis causa.
Possession or delivery was made at the time of the gift;
and the donor died of that illness in a few hours after the
making of the gift. Thus the gift, inchoate conditional,
and defeasible when made, became absolute at the donor's
death. Delivery is essential. It may be either actual, by
manual tradition of the subject of the gift, or constructive,
by delivery of the means of obtaining possession. Constructive delivery is always sufficient when actual, manual
delivery is either impracticable or inconvenient. The contents of a warehouse, trunk, box, or other depository may
be sufficiently delivered by delivery of the key of the receptacle.'
Many cases were cited by the appellant. In some of
them it did not appear that there was any intention to give,
while in others the delivery of possession was not complete;
the donor intentionally retaining control or dominion. In the
cases of Miller v. Jeffress'2 there was no delivery whatever,
either actual or constructive. The delivery of the keys to
Bettie Lewis, with words of gift, by her father, upon his
death-bed, invested her with the same means of obtaining
possession that Thomas had, and made her the owner, with
title defeasible only by recovery or revocation of the donor,
or by a deficiency of assets to pay creditors; and the mere
existence in Stephen B. Hughes' hands of a duplicate set
of keys, for precaution against loss or accident, which he
had no right or authority to use, did not impair the validity
of the gift which lie did make to his daughter in his last
1

Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch., 3oo; Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr., 431;
i White & T. Lead, Cas. Eq., 12o5; Jones v. Brown, 34 N. H., 445; Cooper
v. Burr, 45 Barb., io; Penfield v. Thayer, 2 R. D. Smith, 305; Westerlo
v. Dewitt, 36 N. V., 341; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich., 18S; Hillebrant v.
Brewer, 6 Tex., 45; Elam v. Keen, 4 Leigh, 333; Stephenson v. King, Sr
Ky., 415; Lee's Executor v. Boak, II Grat., 182.
24 Grat., 472; Lewis v. Mason, 84 Va., 731; io S. E. Rep., 529;
Yancy v. Field, 85 Va., 756; 8 S. E. Rep., 721; Rowe v. Marchant, 86
Va., 177; 9 S. E. Rep., 995.
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moments, in the most unqualified manner; and being thus
invested with lawful ownership, the law, in case of refusal
by the officers of the bank, would open the doors to her.
It is contended that the gift was testamentary, because of
the words in the affidavits of Bettie Lewis and Fannie
Coles-" were her's in case of his death;" "to be her's in
case of his death." The affidavits were prepared by counsel and certified by the notary as a predication for the appointment of receivers, and they were not intended, and
could not be regarded as evidence; and they do not purport
to give the language of the affiants, nor to state the language and actions, in detail, of Mr. Thomas in making the
gift. But even if Mr. Thomas had used the very words,
"to be hers in case of his death," it would have been but
expressing in terms the very definition, substance and form
of a gift vzorlis causa, as given by all the law writers and
adjudged cases-that it is conditional, defeasible, not to be
absolute and irrevocable unless and until the death of the
donor from the impending peril, under the apprehension of
which the gift was made.' The cases in which gifts made
in similar and identical language by dying donors have
been held to be valid donations wzo;-/is causa are numerous;
the principle being that the expression, "In case of my
death it is yours," or like words, do not of themselves make
a testamentary disposition, but merely express the condition
which the law annexes to every donation mnor/is causa.' In
the case of Sterling v. Wilkinson,3 the gift was made
more than three years before the donor died, and was
not made in view of death impending; and the donor
actually did retain and exercise control over the subject of
1Bouv. Law Dict., "Donalio morlis causa;" i Abb. Law Dict.,

402;

2 Jac. Law Dict., 307; 3 Por. Eq. Jur., ' 1146; 2 Schouler Pers. Prop. (2d
Ed.), c. 5,
135; Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick., 198; Grover v. Grover, 24

Pick., 261; Gano z. Fisk, 43 Ohio St., 462; 3 N. E. Rep., 532; Taylor v.
Henry, 48 Md., 550.
2Snellgrove v. Baily, 3 Atk., 214; English notes to Ward v. Turner,
i White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq., 1222; Ashbrook v. Ryon, 2 Bush., 228;
Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y., 17.
33 S. E. Rep., 533; 83 Va., 791.
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the gift by disposing of so many of the bonds as were
necessary to indemnify his indorsers. In the case of Basket
v. Hassell,1 the decision turned alone on the construction
and legal effect of the indorsement upon the certificate by
the donor: "Pay to Martin Basket; . . . no one else;
then not until my death." This was held to be a testamentary disposition; but in the opinion of the court, Mr.
Justice MATTHEWS says; "The certificate was payable on
demand; and it is unquestionable that a delivery of it to
the donee with an indorsement in blank, or a special indorsement to the donee, or without indorsement, would
have transferred the whole title and interest of the donor
in the fund represented by it, and might have been valid as
a donalio morlis causa."
It is contended that the gift by Thomas, in this case ,
was invalid because it comprised the bulk of his estate.
The jus distonendi is the essential value and element of
property, and the exercise of that right is commended in
the beatitude, "It is more bressed to give than to receive."
By the law of Virginia a person may make a dying disposition of all of his personal property, donalio mor/is causa;
and there is no limit as to the extent of the gift-whether
of the whole or of the part-intervivos or donatio mior/is
causa. Such limitation can only be by express legislation,
and the courts are invested with no such function. The
Roman or civil law of donaliones mo/is causa did recognize
the limitation or restriction; but the common law does not
limit the amount, absolute or comparative, of the personal
estate which may thus be disposed of.'
It is contended that the gift in this case comes within
the operation of section 2414 of the Code of Virginia; and
as the donor and donee resided together at the time of the
gift, possession by the donee at the common place of residence was not sufficient, and for that reason the gift must
1107 U. S., 602, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 415.
I lichener v. Dale, 23 Pa. St., 59; Seabright v. Seabright, 28 W. Va.,
481; Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Ale., 327; White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. pt. 2, p.
1251; 2 Schouler, Pers. Prop., 132-136.
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fail.

The section is: "No gift of any goods or chattels

shall be valid unless by deed or will, or unless actual possession shall have come to and remained with the donee, or
some person claiming under him. If the donor or donee
reside together at the time of the gift, possession at the
place of their residence shall not be a sufficient possession,
within the meaning of this section."
In the construction
of statutes the general rule is that the words used in the
statute are to be construed according to their natural and
ordinary, popular and accepted, use and meaning, unless it
plainly appear that it was intended by the legislature to
give to them a different, special and extraordinary meaning.
All the law writers use the simple term "gift," when used
without qualification, to express the "ordinary gift" or
"simple gift" which transfers an absolute and irrevocable
title to the donee, as contradistinguished from the extraordinary and technical gift mor/is causa, which is made under
the apprehension of impending death, and transfers only a
conditional, defeasible and revocable interest. The peculiar
gift vmo-/is caitsa is always designated by its special, technical name; and it is never understood or intended to be
embraced or expressed by the term "gift," merely. A gift
mom-lis camsa is a very different thing from a "gift" in
many essential particulars.' The policy of the section
(2414) originated in 1757, and again in 1758 and in 1787,
in the Revised Code of I819, in the Code of 1849, and in
the Code of 1887; and in none of these enactments is the
special, peculiar and distinctive technical descriptive phrase,
"gifts mom-lis camsa," to be found. The mischief intended
to be guarded against in the policy of the statute was as to
gifts incm- v'zos; and until 1849 it was applicable only to
gifts of slaves. Then it was made to embrace all "goods
and chattels;" but it would violate both reason and analogy
to hold that in its new, any more than in its ancient form,
it would embrace gifts mor/is causa. It is an established
rule of construction that the existing law is not intended
12 Kent, Comm. lecture 33; 2 Schouler, Pers. Prop. (2 Ed.), P 64.
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to be changed unless such intention plainly appear; and
the inference is irresistible that the legislature did not
intend to abrogate the common law of donatio mortis causa,
without having expressly and by proper, descriptive, legal
language said so.' The disposition of personal property by
donatio mortis causa has been a principle and practice of
the common law, both in England and in the States of this
Union, for centuries past; and although, since the day of
Lord HARWICKE, there have been extrajudicial utterances
in deprecation of it, it is to-day a fixed principle of enlightened jurisprudence in all civilized countries. It is the imperative function of the courts to interpret and operate the
law as it is, not as they may think it ought to be.
In the able and elaborate opinion of Judge LEAKE,
filed with the record in this case, he decided (saying, "but
certainly not without doubts," "the question to my mind
is a very doubtful one") that the gift by Mr. Thomas of
his bank book, showing the amount of his deposits in the
Planters' National Bank, was ineffectual in law as a donatio
mortis causa of the money to his credit in the said bank;
and he decreed accordingly. In this I am of the opinion
the decree under review is erroneous, and that it should
be, under the rule, in this particular, corrected in favor of
the appellees, and in all other respects affirmed; but the
majority of the Court think the decree is wholly right, and
that it must be affirmed as it is. Every species of personal
property-in its largest sense-capable of delivery, actual
or constructive, may be the subject of a valid gift mortis
causa, including money, bank notes, stocks, bonds, notes,
due bills, certificates of deposit and any other written evidence of debt.' In the case of Coleman v. Parker3 it is
said: "This term 'delivery' is not to be taken in such a
I Parramore v. Taylor, ii Grat., 242, 243; Owners v. Bragdon, 21
Grat., 695; Durham v. Dunkly, 6 Rand. Va., 139.
2Lee's Ex'r v. Boak, ii Grat., 182, and cases there cited; Elam v.
Keen, 4 Leigh, 333; 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq., 1205; Duffleld v.
Elwes, I Bligh (N. S.), 497; Grover v. Grover, 24 Pick., 265.
3 114 Mass., 33.
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narrow sense as to impbrt that the chattel or property is to
go literally into the hands of the recipient, and to be carried away. There are many' articles which might be made
the subjects of a donation morlis causa, in which a manual
delivery of that kind might be inconvenient or impracticable.
We have no doubt that a trunk, with its contents, might
be effectually given and delivered in such a case by a
delivery of the key. . . ."
In the case of Cooper v.
Burr,' it is said: "The situation, relation and circumstances of the parties, and of the subject of the gift, maybe
taken into consideration in determining the intent to give,
and the fact as to delivery. A total exclusion of the power
or means of resuming possession by the donor is not necessary."
In Elam v. Keen, ' Judge CARR said: "There are
many things of which actual, manual tradition cannot be
made, either from their nature or their situation at the
time. It is not the intention of the law to take from the
owner the power of giving these. It merely requires that
he shall do what, under the circumstances will, in reason,
be considered equivalent to an actual delivery."
In Hatch
z,. Atkinson, 3 the Court said that delivery must be as coinplete '! as the nature of the property would admit of" 4 In
Stephenson's Adin'r v. King, the Court, referring to the
case of Ashbrook v. Ryon, as to the bank book, says:
"What evidence the pass book contains of the deposit in
that case does not appear. It an ordinary pass book (and
it must be so inferred), it was an acknowledgment by the
bank that the donor had to his credit in the bank that
much money; and when actually delivered, we cannot see
why it did not pass the right." Suppose Mr. Thomas, instead of having certificates of deposits made and entered by
the bank in his bank book, had taken a separate receipt or
certificate of deposit for each deposit at the time it was
Barb., 9.
4 Leigh., 335356 Me., 324.
' See Wing v. Merchant, 57 Me., 383; Dole v. Lincoln; 31 Me., 422;
Hillebrant z,. Brewer, 6 Tex., 45; Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns., 52; Jones v.
Brown, 34 N. H., 445; Marsh v. Fuller, iS N. H., 36o.
5 81 Ky., 425.
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made. Would not the delivery, with words of gift of each
one, of such receipts or certificates of deposit have been as
effectual in law to pass the title to his money in bank as
the delivery of the letter in Stephenson's Adin'r z,. King,
or the attorney's receipt for claims in his hands for collection in Elam v. Keen? Mr. Thomas' bank book had just
been written up or balanced by the bank, and it showed on
its face the balance due to him by the bank. It was the
bank's acknowledgment of indebtedness to Thomas, and
the only voucher or evidence which he had, upon which
the law implies a promise to pay; and it was transferable
by delivery without writing, like any other chose in action.
It passed the equitable title, and that is sufficient. The
"beneficial owner" of any chose in action may sue upon
it in his own name.1 There is a difference between a savings bank pass book and an ordinary bank book, in that by
a special method and agreement, on the mere presentation
of the savings bank pass book, the bank will pa-, but this
is the mere special mode of dealing agreed on by the parties
in that case; and, though the bank would have the right to
require evidence to satisfy it that Mr. Thomas had duly
delivered, with words of gift sufficient in law to transfer
his title to his noney in the bank to his donee, Bettie
Lewis, his daughter, yet that would not, any more than in
the case of the keys, affect her title and right to demand
the money, which the law would enforce.
This case was first argued before Chancellor FIrzHUGH, and submitted for his decision; but he died in a few
days, leaving nothing to show what conclusion he would
have reached upon the facts. He had (as it appears by
what is stated in the petitiofi for appeal), noted down a few
platitudes or propositions of law, which (no more than if he
had copied the Decalogue), do not afford the slightest clue
as to what he would have decreed upon the facts, under
the law. We have given to this case elaborate consideration and the closest scrutiny, and, upon the law and the
facts, our judgment is to affirn the decree of the chancery
court of the city of Richmond.
Section 286o, Code Va., ISS7.
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this if not in the other Roman forms,
To the unique position occupied
for they, partaking of the nature of
by gifts m~ortis causa in English
legacies, were deliverable only after
law is traceable much of that
the death of the donor (Swinburne
strange contrariety in the decided
on Wills, cited by Lord LOUGHBORcases which a glance at the reports
reveals. Their omission from the OUGn in Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. Jr.,
iig; Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr.,
Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3,
was due to the general ignorance
431; White & Ind. L. C. Eq., lO89;
of their nature, since the toleration Sohm's Roman Law, i38-r39).
The modern idea of a gift mortis
of noncupative wills prior to that
causa shows these gifts to be a hyenactment postponed the occasion
for their appearance before the brid growth of the parentage of
courts, though Bracton and Glan- both a legacy and a gift inter vivos.
ville had made them familiar as They resemble legacies, in that
early as Henry II (Schouler, Wills, they are ambulatory and revocable;
and they differ from legacies and
19o; Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sen.,
are like gifts, inter vivos, in the
436; Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. Jr., 119.
To engraft an exception on the fact that control of the chattel is
wills clause of the statute, the Ro- completely vested in the donee,
man Law was called upon to fur- during the donor's lifetime (2 Bl.
nish the principle upon which to
CoM., 514; 2 Kent Com., 445; Jones
v.Selby, Pric. Ch., 300; Hedges v.
support these death gifts. Adopted
at first subject to very narrow limi- Hedges, Ibid., 269; Daury v. Smith,
I P. Wins., 404; Lawson v. Lawtations, they have assumed such
proportions,until now, as strikingly
son, P. Wins., 440).
The gift of all a man's estate.illustrated in the principal case, a
man may give away his entire es- In the principal case it was strongly
tate to a bedside attendant by the urged that the donor's act, as evidenced by the gift of all his persimple act of delivery, proved by
one witness, and rather slender cor- sonal estate amounting to $225,000,
was testamentary in character, and
roborating circumstances (Headley
v. Kirby, 18 Pa., 326; Hedges v. hence void as a noncupative will.
Hedges, Bill in Ch., 269; Jones v. And this argument has received
Selby, Ibid. 300; Ward v. Turner, the sanction of considerable authority.
2 Ves. Sr., 436; 2 Kent's CoM., 445;
(Schouler's Pers. Prop., Vol. 2, p.
In Headley v. Kirby, 18 Pa., 326,
the donor said, "Ann, I am dying;
145).
Of the three notions of a donatio all that I have is here and all is
mortis causa at the Roman Law, yours; do everything for me; here
the one adopted by the law of Bug- are my keys, take them." The
land, is that which is given in the property which was thus attempted
Digest as the second: where the to be given consisted of a watch
and chain, pencil case, teaspoons,
property in the chattel passed at
trunks, a promissory note for
the time the gift was made, and
which was defensible in the event $r,6oo, a book of deposit in a saving fund, etc. The Supreme Court
of an escape from the danger or
the illness which prompted it. De- refused to uphold the gift. LowREY,J. : "The gift in the case belivery was absolutely essential in
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fore us professed to dispose of all
donor-nothing more than a conthe donor's property, and to be structive delivery occurred-the
made in prospect of death, and is language was evidently testamentherefore a will if it receive the tary-and it referred expressly to
sanction of the law ...
. And
all her property."
And a gift was
it may be safely declared that no
accordingly upheld of a bag of gold,
mere gift made in prospect of death
though it constituted the doner's
and professing to pass all one's
entire estate.
property to another, to take effect
In a note to Meach v. Meach, 24
after death, can be valid under our
Vt., Judge REDFIELD pointed out
statute of wills, no matter what the absurdity of the proposition, by
delivery may have accompanied it."
attempting to draw the line, as to
While the conclusion reached by
what shall be the money limit or
the Court was obviously correct,
the ratio of the gift to the entire
the gift failing for want of delivery,
estate, in any case, which shall dethe dictum is subject to criticism.
fine where a valid gift ends, and a
The fallacy of the learned judge's
testamentary disposition begins. If
argument rests in that a valid gift one may remit a debt of £Soo, by
mortis causa of all a man's estate
the simple act of delivering the recan never be a will, because the ceipt for it to a third person, with
essential element of a will is lack- a general expression of desire in
ing-namely, that the testator have the briefest words that the debt
entire control, or the right to con- shall be cancelled (Moore v. Dartrol, the interest he attempts to be- ton, 7 Eng. L. and Eq. R., 134), it
queath until death; while it is fatal
can scarcely be said that twice that
to the donee's case if the donor
amount is, therefore, not a good
mortis causa has not parted with donatio mortis causa, simply bethe immediate control of the prop- cause it is twice that amount.
erty (Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr.,
It is believed, therefore, and upon
431; Duffield v. Elwes, I Bligh, N. sufficient grounds that the accident
S., 497; Drury v. Smith, 1 P. Vms.,
of a man's entire estate, or the
404; Miller v. Miller, 3 Atk., 356;
greater part thereof, consisting of
Hill v. Chapman, 3 Bro. C. C., 612;
personal property, ought not, and
Schouler's Pers. Prop., 162.
generally will not, militate against
This question came before the the donee's right, the other eleSupreme Court again in Miehener
ments of a valid gift mortis causa
v. Dale, 23 Pa. St., 64, wherein we
being present.
have the following explanation of
The fact, however, that a man
Headley v. Kirby, from Mr. justice
has disposed of his entire estate by
WOODWARD: "It was greatly in- gift, raises a strong presumption
sisted on in argument that the that he intended a gift morliscausa
Court ought to have instructed the rather than an irrevocable donajury that if the gold was the firin- tion inter vivos. So where there is
cipal part of Mr. Dale's property, a contest as to whether a gift has
he could not make a donatio mor- been made, its magnitude may be
tis causa of it, and for this Headley
the foundation of an inference,
v. Kirby was relied on. In that
where an issue has been framed to
case there was a variety of chattels a common law court, to try by
-they were not specified by the jury the fact of the gift, that no
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gift was made, and that the alleged
donor really made a noncupative
will (Seabright v. Seabright, 28 W.
Va., 415; Hatch v. Alinson, 56 Me.,
326. See an article, Vol. I, p. i,
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, treating of Headley v. Kirby; Furgharson v. Cave, 2 Coll. Ch. 356.)
The bulk of authority favors the
support of the gift even of the entire estate, where there has been
specific delivery of the subject matter (Marshall v. Berry, 13 Allen,
43; Schouler, sec. 146).
It is of the essence of a valid gift
that the donor part with the immediate control of the subject matter;
if the donee's control is delayed
until after the death of the donor,
the act is testamentary.
In Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S.,
602, the donor endorsed on the
back of a certificate of deposit,
"Pay to Martin Basket, of Henderson, Ky.; no one else; then not till
my death," etc., it was held that it
was a testamentary disposition of
the fund represented by the certificate (Mitchell v. Smith, 4 De J.
and S., 422; Daniel v. Smith (Cal.),
17 Pac. Rep., 68 3 ; Walter v. Ford,
74 Mo., 195; Reddell v. Dobree, io
Sinl., 249; Earle v. Bostford, 23
New Bruns., 407).
The test as to whether the donor's
act, in any particular case, is testamentary, rather than a donation is:
If the gift does not take effect as an
executed and complete transfer to
the donee of possession and title,
either legal or equitable, during
the life of the donor, but only confers upon the donee the power to
control the property, after the
death of the donor then the character of the act is testamentary, and
within the provisions of the wills
act.
In Edwards v. Tones, i My. and

Cr., 226, Lord COTTENHAm declared

"that a donatio vnorlis causa leaves
the whole title in the donor, unless
the event occurs which is to divest
him." The statement is misleading, since the donor's title mustbe
completely divested by the act of
delivery, subject to revest in him
ipso facto upon his recovery from
the threatened peril (Seabright v.
Seabright, 28 V. Va.).
i r. 171ust be made in apprehension
of death.
"D_)onalio viortis causa," it is
said in the Digest, "mors causa
donandi, magis est quat morlis
causa donatio"-death is rather
the cause of the gift than the mere
occasion of its being made (Dig.
Lib. 2, tit. 7; Sohm's Roman Law,
p. 139; Meach v,. Meach, 24 Vt.).
And GIBsoN, C. J., said it was immaterial whether the anticipation
of death be induced by sickness or
by any other cause; as where the
donor was infirm with age or about
to undertake a hazardous journey,
or a soldier preparing for battle
(Nicholas v. Adams, 2 1,h. 17;
but see Roberts v. Draper. 18 Bradw.,
167; Earle v. Bostford, 23 New
Bruns., 407).
This position has been followed
in Gass v. Simpson, 4 Cold. (Tenn.),
288, where the donor was in danger
of assassination, incident to escape
from the Confederate conscription;
and in Virgin v. Gaither, 42 Ill.,
39, where a gift made by a
soldier going to the front was sufficient (Nicholson z'. Adams, 2 Wh.,
iU; but see Roberts v'. Draper, 18
Bradw., 167; Earle v. Bostford, 23
New Bruns., 407).
Subject to the instances mentioned, it is very well settled in
nearly every other jurisdiction that
the gift must be made with reference to some particular cause of
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death, which either exists at the
time or the donor imagines to
exist, and which may result in his
death (Miller v. Miller, i P. Wins.,
356; Robson v. Robson, 3 Del. Ch.,
5I; Knott v. Hogan 4 Metc. (Ky.),
Iox; Smith v. Ferguson, 20 Ind.,
350; Michener v. Dale, 22 Pa., 59;
Parker v. Savings Bank, 78 Me.,
47o; Gomley v. Litsenberger, 51
Pa., 345; Smith v. Dorsey, 30 Ind.,
451; Craig v. Kittridge, 46 N. H.,
57; Duffield v. Elwes, I Bligh N. S.,
497). The peril must be immediate,
and it seems that a very strong case
is required to support a gift made
by one in infirm old age with no
other apprehension than that which
comes from such a condition:
Schouler, p. 146. In Grymes v.
Hone, 49 N. Y., 117, a gift made
by a man eighty years old, in failing health, which continued to his
death, was upheld (Dorland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503).
If the donor recover from the
illness which threatens him at the
time the gift is made, and subsequently die, the donation is revoked
ilisofacto by the recovery: Keston
v. Hight, 17 Me., 287; Stariland v.
Willot, 3 Mac. and Gov., 664. But
any change in the donor's mind as
to his chances of recovery will not
affect the donation, for a disposition
by donatio orlis causa is not to
:be disturbed by the alternation of
-iope and despair, dependent upon
-the doubtful spinning of the die,
3but only by the turn up of life:
vGILSON, J., Nicholson v. Adams,
ufra.I
There is reason in the principle
which would confine within the
limits ofan immediatefierilofdeath,
whether from sickness or any external danger, the condition essential
to support a valid gift. If a man in
perfect health, fearing the outcome

of a dangerous journey, hands over
his property to his son, requesting
that it be delivered back to him on
his return, the Courts will refuse to
uphold the gift in the event of his
death, because the Legislature has
provided, out of reasons of public
policy, a formal mode of accomplishing the same end without the
corresponding danger of frauds.
(Roberts v. Draper, 18 Bradw., 167;
Prince v. Hazelton, 20 John's
(N. Y.), 513; 2 Finch's Prec. in
Ch. 269; Shirley v. Whitehead, i
Ired. Eq. (N. C.), i3o; Robson v.
Robson, supra.) In Irish v. Nutting, 47 Barb. (N. Y.), 385, the
learned Court confined the danger
to a death by sickness: Dexter v.
Gautier, 5 Robt., 216.
iii. Evidence of the gift. Delivery of the means of "getting at"
the chattel sufficient.
Lord HARDWIc r., in 1749, upheld a gift of a bond, induced by
mere delivery upon the very technical ground that "Tho' you may
give evidence of a deed at law that
is lost, you cannot of a bond, for
you must make profert of it." He
who has the bond may do what he
pleases with it and thus disable the
donor from bringing an action.
Moreover, bonds in English law
were regarded as bona notabilia,
and administration had to be taken
out in the parish where the bond
was found: Snellgrove v. Baily, 3
Atk., 214.
In Lord ELDON'S time profert
was no longer necessary, but that
chancellor decided that the delivery
of the bond transferred the debt
represented by the bond, being
sufficient evidence of the parting
of dominion by the donor: Duffield
v. E lwes, i Bligh, N. S.1
"The question in any case is this,
whether the act of the donor being,
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as far as the act of the donor itself
is to be viewed complete, the persons who represent that donor
are not bound to complete that which, as far as the act
of the donor is concerned in the
question, was incomplete; in other
words, where it is the gift of a personal chattel . . . which is the
subject of the donation viorlis
causa, whether after the death of
the individual who made that gift,
the executor is not to be considered
a trustee for the donee.
....
I apprehend that really the question does not turn at all upon what
the donor could do, or what the
donor could not do; but if it was
a good donatio morlis causa, what
the donee of that donor could call
upon the representatives of the
donor to do after the death of that
donor. See also Story's Eq., Section 607 c."
This is the great test in any case
as to whether the donee has sufficient title to enforce his gift (see
Gardner v. Gardner, 3 Mad. Ch.,
185; Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binney,
370; Blount v. Edwards, 4 Bro. Ch.,
72; Parrish v. Stone, [4 Pick.
(Mass.), 205; Waring's Adm. v.
Edwards, ii Md., 424).
Having reached the conclusion
that the delivery of a bond would
uphold a gift of the debt, what
attitude should be assumed towards
a gift, by delivery, of a mortgage
deed? Lord HARDivicKE refused
to decide this question in Hassel v.
Tynte, Amb., 319; but in 2 Atkins,
319, he is reported as saying that if
a mortgagee gave to his mortgagor
the deeds of the mortgage and that
fact was proved, it was a gift of the
money for which the deeds were
security.
But there was a difficulty to obviate-the Statute of Frauds. Lord

ELDON, explaining Lord HARDwicKs, disposed of it after this
fashion: If a mortgagee gave a
mortgagor the deeds, the Statute
would not stand in the way; for
the deeds being in the hands of the
mortgagor, though the estate in the
land was still in the mortgagee,
yet by operation of law, a trust
would be created in the mortgagee,
to make a good gift of the debt to
the mortgagor to whom he had
delivered the deeds.
The double phase of the legal
aspect of a mortgage-an estate in
fee upon condition, and a security
for the debt is relied on to sustain
the principle, that having shown
"that the debt is well given or well
forgiven, as a result of the interest
given, the person who has the land
becomes in equity trustee for the
person entitled to the money."
Agreeably to the above reasoning,
a gift of mortgages and judgments
on a mortgage, aggregating in
value ,/3o,ooo, was sustained in the
House of Lords; Duffield v. Elwes,
i Bligh N. S., 5r4; Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray, 418; Duncombe v.
Richards, 46 Mich., 166; Hurst v.
Beach, 5 Madd., 351.
Duffield v. Elwes created almost
a revolution in this branch of the
law, opening the door to every form
of negotiable instrument, shares of
stock and the like (Schouler Pers.
Prop., Sec. 135). In fine, delivery
of the means of "getting at " a
fund or a chattel, would be sufficient to support a gift mortis causa
of that fund or that chattel.
a. Delivery of a key.
It is upon the principle enunciated by Lord ELDON that the delivery of a key of a receptacle, under certain conditions, will suffice
to uphold a gift of the contents of
that receptacle. The positive con-
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dition annexed to such a ruling,
however, is that the box or trunk
be beyond the control or custody
of the donor. In Powell v. Hellicar,
26 Beav., 261, a dressing case, the
keys of which were delivered, remained in the custody of the donor.
The Court held the gift incomplete;
and the same doctrine has received
sanction in this country: Reddell v.
Dobree, IO Sim., 244; Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me., 324; Headley v.
Kirby, 18 Pa., 326; Cooper v. Burr,
45 Barb., 9; Coleman v. Parker, 114
Mass., 30.
"While delivery of the key of a
warehouse or other place of deposit, where cumbrous articles are
kept, may constitute a sufficient
constructive or symbolical delivery
of such articles, it is well settled
that delivery of the key of a trunk,
chest or box in which valuable articles are kept, which are capable
of being taken into the hand, and
may be delivered by being passed
from hand to hand, is not a valid
delivery of such articles": WALToN, 3., Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me.,
326.
The rule stated is slightly incorrect. The fact that the donor could
have handed over the contents is
no test. The question is in every
case, has the donor parted with his
custody of the receptacle and is it
beyond his control? (see Schouler's
Pers. Prop., 163).
6. Delivery of Negotiableinstruments.
That there can be a valid gift
mortis causa by a mere delivery
of the check, promissory note or
bill of exchange of a third party in
the hands of the donor, is beyond
question at this time: Parish v.
Stone, 14 Pick., 198; Harris v.
Clarke, 3 Coins., 93; Bank v. Williams, 13 Mich., 282; Hewitt v.

Kaye, L. R., 6 eq., 198; Clement
v. Cheeseman, 24 Ch. Di., 631; Veal
v. Veal., 27 Beav., 303. And this
is true even without the donor's
endorsement, for the donee can reduce the property he has acquired,
into possession, in the name of the
executor or administrator, agreeably to a well settled rule of
the common law that the real
owner of a chose in action can always enforce it against the nominal
legal owner: Lennox v. Roberts, 12
Wh.; Veal v. Veal, 27 Beav., 303;
Duffield v. Elwes, i Bligh N. S.,
497; Bates v. Kempton, 7 Gray, 382.
But where the donor has delivered
to the donee his own promissory
note, .the donee cannot enforce it
against the estate of the donor, because being merely a promise to
pay, is a gift unexecuted, and the
plea of want of consideration defeats the action at the threshold:
Parrish v. Stone, supra; Raymond
v. Selick, IO Conn., 480; Tate v.
Hilbert, 2Ves., iii; Harris v. Clark,
3 Coins., 93.
There is still another reason why
delivery of the donor's promissory
note, without more is insufficient to
constitute a valid donation : A gift
mortis causa is always revocable
until death, and there may have
come a locus poenitentiz during the
donor's life, the evidence of which
is buried with him. (See 6 Harv.
L. Rev., p. 37).
And the donor's bill of exchange
or his check stands in the same
plight as his note: (Veal v. Veal,
supra.) But if the donee should
endorse the check or bill or note to
a third person the endorsee could
enforce the obligation against the
personal representatives of the donor; or if the donee should reduce
the chose in action into possession,
as by discounting the check at bank
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or procure the acceptance of the bill
the effect would be a valid donation
viortis cauzsa;though subject to the
limitation it seems that if the acceptor should refuse to meet the
bill, the conditional liability of
drawer could not be imposed upon
the donor's representatives.
The principle underlying all
these cases is, that the delivery of
a third party's paper is a gift of an
actual subsisting part of the donor's
property, just as much so as the
delivery of a specific piece of
money, and places the asset so
given beyond the pale of administration. An instrument which has
no other merit than the name of
the donor, simply contemplates a
charge against the latter's estate as
a recent writer points out: "It is
perfectly possible that one may be
willing to give a stated amount of
money or property to another, but
would never wish to authorize in
any way post vortem litigation
against his estate; and checks,
bills and notes given by way of
donatio morlis causa are given
probably always by laymen in ignorance of their real effect": 6
Harvard Law Review, 39.
Speaking of this subject, Malins
V. C. said: "The law seems to be in
a very curious state. The result of
the authorities appears to be that a
gift of a bill of exchange, which is
by its nature payable at a future
day, may be a good donatio morlis
causa, but the gift of a check is
not valid, unless it is presented for
payment or paid before the death
of the donor. Now, I can really
see no reason why, if a bill drawn
on a goldsmith, would be a good
donalio mortis causa, a check
should not be so too."
In the case before him, a donor
handed two checks to his wife, pay-

able to her order, which she had
discounted in a foreign bank. They
were presented to the drawees for
payment after his death, and paymentwas refused. The widow then
refunded what she had received on
them, and sought re-imbursement
from the executors. She virtually
became endorsee of the checks,
and the parties were practically in
the same plight as before thenegotiation of them; that is, she was
the holder of a paper, given by the
donor, and hence could not enforce
the claim against her husband's
estate, if legal authority was complied with. But the Court upheld
her claim. The only principle upon which such a conclusion could
have been reached, was that the
widow was a holder for value and
without notice, an absurdity which
could hardly have been tolerated
(6 Har. v. S. R., 39).
The basis of the decision, so far
as precedent is concerned, was
Lauson v. Lauson, I P. Wins., 441,
decided in r71S.
A dying man
gave his wife a purse and bill of
exchange on his goldsmith, with
which to buy mourning for the
funeral. Sir Joseph Jekyll, M.R.,
held it to be a good donatio vinortis
causa as to the purse; and as to the
bill of exchange, he first held that
the testator's ordering the goldsmith to pay /oo to his wife, was
but an authority and determined
by the testator's death; but, subsequently, became of opinion that,
having been given "to the wife for
mourning, it was like directions for
a funeral, and should be given
effect, if possible, since it operated
as an appointment."
In Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves., Jr.
r11-r2r, Lord LOUGEBO-ROUGa said
the decision was perfectly correct;
"taking the whole bill to
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gether, it is an appointment of the
money in the banker's hands, to
the extent of £ioo, for the particular purpose expressed in a written appointment;" the testatorhaving endorsed on the bill that it was
for his wife's mourning. "But upon that decision I cannot say, that,
in all events, drawing a cash note
upon a banker is an appointment
of the money in his hands."
That Lauson v. Lauson was incorrectly decided, and has been
tacitly overruled, there can be no
question. In Beak v. Beak, 13 Eq.,
491, Bacon, V. C., said: "The
estate of an intestate has to be administered by his representatives,
and the authorities are clear and
distinct that where a man draws a
check and gives it to somebody, if
that check is not presented until
after the donor's death, for the
amount of the check, his estate is
not liable."
To the same effect
was Hewitt v. Kaye, L. R., 6 Eq.,
198; In re Mead, L. R., 15 Ch. D.,
651.
In Broome v. Broome, L. R., 6
Eq., 27, the donee made two unsuccessful attempts to cash the donor's
check during the latter's life-time,
but it was held that the gift could
be upheld, because complete. I
conceive that no further act was
necessary to make the gift complete," per Stuart, V. C. In other
words, a faultless attempt to reduce
the fund represented by the check
into possession, may, under circumstances, be equivalent to possession.
It seems that the gift of a donor's
check upon a banker might be enforced against his estate, by the
donee, if a legal analogy be accepted. A check drawn either for
the part or whole of a fund in bank
is not regarded as an assignment of

that fund for the protection of the
banker. "A creditor shall not be
permitted to split up a single cause
of action into many actions, without the assent of his debtor, since
it may subject him to many embarrassments and responsibilities
not contemplated in the original
contract (Mandeville v. Welch, 5
Wh., 288). That is, a check is in
effect an assignment of the fund
represented by it, but the legal incidents of an assignment do not
attach to it, in order to protect the
banker from the vexation of a multiplicity of suits at the hands of a
number of assignees, or the depositor himself.
With the death of the donor the
authority of the bank to pay the
fund ceases, and the property vests
in the personal representatives of
the donor immediately (Byles on
Bills, p. 378; Bout v. Ellis, iiBeav.,
121).
The claim of a donee, therefore, is directed against the executor, and the reason for denying that
the check is an assignment and
attaching the incidents, ceases, since
there can be no danger of a multiplicity of suits against the bank
(Bank of Republic v. Millard, Io
Wall, 512). The executor or administrator, holds the fund derived from
the bank in trust for the assignee,
the holder of the check.
The proposition suggested is
neither absurd nor without legal
analogies.
Lord HARDWICKm, a
century and a half ago, said if a
man delivered over the grand bill
of sale of a ship, the other elements of a valid gift being present,
it would be upheld, though the
donee had only an equitable title
-a
proposition never doubted.
And in our time the thought is
quite familiar that the delivery of
the certificate of stock will support
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a gift of the shares, provided no
equities of the corporation intervene (see Cook on Stocks, ?. 308).
It seems to the writer that the analogy in the last instance is perfect
-you can have a valid gift if you
do not trample upon the rights of
a third person, namely, the corporation. In the check case a complete gift exists provided the shield
furnished for the protection of the
banker is not pierced.
c. Delivery of PassBooks as dislinguished from Saving Bank
Books.
In the principal case the Court
refused to uphold a gift of the passbook showing a balance in the
donor's favor of $i8,ooo, because
being a formal statement of an account, it had not the merit of representing a chose in action, and
bore about the same legal relation
for the purpose of the law of gifts
vzorlis causa as a book of original
entry (see Walsh's Ap., 122 Pa.,
But a distinction has been
177).
taken between a savings bank book
and a pass-book on a banker.
"A saving's bank book has a peculiar character," observed ENDIcoTT, J., in Pierce v. Boston Savings Bank, 129 2Iass., 432. "It is
not a mere pass-book or the statement of an account, it is issued to
the person in whose name the deposit is made, and with whom the
bank has made its contract; it is
his voucher, and the only security
he has as evidence of his debt.
The bank is not obliged to pay the
depositor the money in its hands,
except upon presentation of the
book; andif in good faith and without notice it pays the money deposited to the person who presents
the book, although the book has
been obtained fraudulently by him,
the bank is not liable to the real
depositor."
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The book is the instrument by
which alone the money can be obtained, and its possession is thus
some evidence of title in the person presenting it at the bank:
Grover v. Grover, ex Pick., 261;
Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass., 472;
Reddall v. Thrall (N. Y.), 26 N. E.
Rep., 627. And the delivery is not
rendered ineffectual by a law of the
bank, requiring an order or power
of attorney from the depositor to
enable a third person to draw the
depositor's money: Reddal v.
Thrall, supra;Sweeny v. Bank, I16
Mass., 384; Wall v. Bank, 3 Allen,
96; Levy v. Bank, 117 Mass., 448;
Goldrick v. Bank, 123 Mass., 320.
But regard must be had to the
laws of the saving fund institution. In Murray v. Gannon, 41
Md., 466, an inter vivos case, the
delivery of the savings bank book
was held not to constitute a good
gift, because the only mode in
which the money could be changed
from one person's account to another in the bank was "by a payment of the one account and a new
deposit in another account."
In England, in McGonnell v.
Murray, Irish Rep., 3 Eq., 46o, a
gift of this nature was held invalid
because the book does not embody
the terms of the contract; but notwithstanding this decision and a
formidable dictum in In re Beak,
13 Eq., 489, the question may be
regarded as an open one.
In the United States, save in
Maryland and Pennsylvania, the
rule seems well settled that the delivery of a savings bank book will
be sufficient to establish a gift
viortis causa: Corr v. McGregor,
43 Hun., 531; Fiero's Est., 2 Hun.,
6oo; Camp's Ap., 36 Conn., 88;
Brown v. Brown, 18 Conn., 410;
Bank v. Taft, 14 R. I., 502; Tillinghast v. Wheaton, 8 R. I., 536; Cur-
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tis v. Bank, 77 Me., 151; Lord v.
Bourne, 63 Me., 368; Hill v. Stevenson, I8 Am. Rep., 231; Morse
on Banks, 6o8.
In Walsh's Ap., 122 Pa., 177, the
question arose for the first time in
Pennsylvania as to whether the
delivery of a savings bank book
to a friend for the donor's sister,
would be upheld as a valid gift
-morliscausa. The Orphans' Court
decided in favor of the donee,
though the rules of the savings
fund corporation required transfer
to be made on their books, in order
to pass the legal title. "Compliance with rules of this character," said PENROSE, J., "is necessary only for the purpose of
establishing the relation between
the corporation and the assignee,
and want of compliance does not
affect the validity of the transaction
as between the original parties, or
persons claiming as volunteers
under them:" Tidewater Co. v.
Kitcheman, 12 Ont., 630; U. S. v.
Vaughn, 3 Binney, 394.
The Supreme Court reversed this
ruling, upon the ground that possession of the book was no evidence
of the ownership of the fund, and
likened the legal status of a savings
bank book to a book of original
entry. The distinction between the
note of a third person and the savings
bank book is said to lie in that the
note represents a promise and the
book a mere assertion, from which
no promise could be implied-a
distinction rather difficult to apprehend.
While it is true there is no promise on the part of the bank to
pay, possession of the book rightfully acquired, is some evidence of
ownership since it puts tremendous
obstacles in the path of the donor or
his representatives, from again

asserting their right to the fund.
It is of the essence of the relation
subsisting between a depositor and
the saving bank, that the evidence
of the relation shall be by the book;
and when presented by the depositor serves to identify him, and is the
authority upon the faith of which
payment is made. Had the donee
paid value for the fund represented
by the book, the bank could not
annex, as a condition precedent to
payment, that he procure a power
of attorney from the donor or his
representatives, having shown he
was the real owner of the fund.
(Reddall v. Thrall, 26 N. B., Rep.
627).
When the donee presents the
book, then is it not fprima fade
evidence of ownership, which becomes complete upon proof that it
was delivered to him with the intention to make him owner?
The delivery of a certificate of
deposit, even though payable to
order, it is intimated by the Court,
would be upheld, when transferred
without endorsement; because the
donee could sue, in the name of the
executor or administrator, without
their assent, and where the endorsement was necessary, go into equity
and compel the endorsement.
Conner v. Root, 17 Pac. Rep.,
773; Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S.,
602; Gourley v. Linsen Vigler, 51
Pa., 349; Amis v. DeWitt, 33 Beav.,
619; Westerloo v. Witt, 36 N. Y.,
34o; Stephen's Adm. v. King, 81
Ky., 425, overruling Ashbrook v.
Ryan, 2 Bush., 228; Moore v.
Moore, 18 Eq., 474; Brook v. Brook,
12 S. C., 46o.
Now, a certificate of deposit is
precisely similar in its legal constitution to the bank book of a savings fund. Presentation of the book
or the certificate entitles the holder

